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Abstract:

Economics and psychology take distinct approaches to predicting and
formalizing human behavior. Economics focuses on the normative
view of rationality, while psychology emphasizes the descriptive
nature of rationality. This article reviews models of rationality related
to understanding human decision making, including notions of
complete rationality, bounded rationality, and ecological rationality.
By examining the aims and functions of such rationality models, the
author wishes to draw attention to the utility of ecological rationality
and adaptive rationality approaches in a unified theoretical model for
understanding human rationality. The ecological rationality approach
evaluates not only by performance, but more importantly by how well
the behavior fits the individual' s environment. The adaptive rationality
approach completes this model by additionally incorporating changes to
the environment.

Keywords: Rationality debate; Bounded rationality; Ecological rationality;
Adaptive Rationality

E

conomics and psychology, two important branches of social sciences,
take distinct approaches to predicting and formalizing human behavior.
As a normative science, economics is mostly concerned with issues of how people
should make optimal decisions. Working from a different angle, psychology
is mainly concerned with describing how decisions are made. Various types
of work have been done at the interface between psychology and economics,
including studies of bounded rationality (Gigerenzer& Selten, 2003, 2001;
Simon, 1955); heuristics and biases in decision-making (Kahneman&Tversky,
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1996; Tversky&Kahneman, 1975), experimental
economics (e.g, Hertwig, 1998; Starmer, 1999), and
behavioral economics (e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein,
& Rabin, 2003; Rabin, 1998).
In this article, I will review the debate and
dialog about rationality among economists and
psychologists. First, a historical review of the
notion of rationality in economics will show that
the idea of rationality in economics is closely
related to the notion of the "economic man",
whose capability in making decisions is beyond
the actual capability of the human mind. Second,
we will review criticisms of the classic economic
view of rationality, represented by the work of
three different research groups: the heuristics
and biases program of Kahneman, Tversky, and
others (Gilovich, Griffin, &Kahneman, 2002),
the notion of bounded rationality advocated by
Herbert Simon (1955; 1956; 1982), and the more
recent view of adaptive rationality proposed by
Anderson (1990), Gigerenzer (2000), and Oaksford
and Chater (1998). The differing approaches
of bounded rationality and adaptive rationality
share the assumption that many aspects of human
behavior can be understood as adaptively rational
for an organism with limited resources in a
structured environment. It is concluded that the
adaptive rationality approach, and in particular the
need to focus on the structure of the environment
is of vital importance to understanding behavior.

1. The Rationality Debate
Rationality is a broad concept that typically
encompasses the appropriate use of logic as well
as "uncertain but sensible arguments" based on
probability, expectation, personal experience and
the like. The rationality debates among economists
and psychologists is mainly constituted of
discussions about complete (unbounded) rationality

and bounded rationality, but also includes debate
regarding whether observed deviations from
the conventional normative standards should be
interpreted as "adaptive rationality" or "irrational
biases". The view of rationality in economics is
undergoing some changes as a result of these debates.

2. Rationality in Economics
The assumption of rationality lies at the heart
of modern economic theory. The concept of
rationality in economics, first introduced by Adam
Smith (1776), is now generally viewed as the choice
of optimal means to achieve a given end (Gerrard,
1993). In one key textbook of microeconomics
(Frank, 2002), being rational is defined in terms of
making choices if and only if the benefits exceed
the costs of the choice. This notion of rationality
is based on the fou r assumptions of Neoclassical Economics, personified in the concept
homo economicus (economic man)-a decision
maker who incorporates the characteristics of
self-interest, omniscience (having complete
information), conscious deliberation (mental
calculation of an optimized "as if" equivalent),
and representativeness (i.e., homo economicus
is representative of all decision makers). The
assumption of rationality in normative economics
amounts to the claim that agents should optimize.
In positive economics, where the focus is on
developing and testing economic theories,
the premise of rationality is the hypothesis of
maintained consistency (Gerrard, 1993). The
concept of rationality through the development of
Economics has however, changed over time, and
the following summary aims to review the different
notions of rationality that have accompanied the
development of economic theories.
The concept of rationality as it appeared in
The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776) was viewed
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in terms of the standards of economic production
and trade. It implied that when people see a clear
advantage in a particular course of action, they
will act upon it. This notion of rationality is the
rationality of everyday common sense. The logic
behind Smith' s work is that when every individual
pursues solely his/her selfish goals, the market will
reach its maximum efficiency. This assumption
of rationality does not depend on an elaborate
calculus of utility or assume any consistency in
the factors that are taken into consideration when
moving from one choice situation to another
(Simon, 1997; Smith, 1937).
In Alfred Marshall' s Principles of Economics
(1920), a wider notion of rationality was developed
to incorporate not only the study of wealth, but
also the study of the economic agent. Rationality
requires the ability to forecast the future and
shape one' s course with reference to distant aims.
The emphasis is placed upon deliberation in
decision making, which involves marginal analysis
(Book IV) and maximization of utility (Book
III). From this point on, neoclassical economics
was established, and economics became more
mathematical in nature. The assumption of
rationality approximated the assumption of
optimality in choices and decisions. Marshall' s
contemporary neoclassical economists—William
Stanley Jevon (1871), Carl Menger (1871), and
Leon Walras (1954) proclaimed that rationality is
exemplified by utility maximization in a general
equilibrium framework.
With John Maynard Keynes' General Theory
of Employment (1936), the concept of rationality
depar ted f rom the key assumptions of the
neoclassical framework. The author claimed that
the neo-classical system represented "the way in
which we should like our Economy to behave…
But to assume that it actually does so is to assume
our difficulties away" (p.34). He asserted that
148

people do not have complete rationality. It was
lapses from rationality of these sorts that brought
about departures from a full employment of
resources, and these lapses could be remedied by
appropriate governmental policies. In The General
Theory, Keynes comments:
There is the instability due to the characteristic
of human nature that a large proportion of our
positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism
rather than on a mathematical expectation,
whether moral or hedonistic or economic…
Most, probably, of our decisions to do something
positive, the full consequences of which will be
drawn out over many days to come, can only be
taken as a result of animal spirits-of spontaneous
urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities
(p.161-162).
Keynes pointed out the unrealistic nature of the
rationality assumption in mainstream economics,
but this line of thought was not followed by others.
In Essays in Positive Economics (1953), Milton
Friedman returned to the Neo-classical version
of rationality. Acknowledging the unrealistic
assumption underlying economic models—that
decision makers have to be "Laplacean Demons"
to be able to make optimization calculations—he
instead proposed that economic agents make
decisions "as if" they were applying complicated
optimizations. He used examples like the
Newtonian physical laws regarding free fall
objects, biological phenomena concerning the
density distributions of trees, and the manner
pool players strike the ball as analogies for how
economic agents "appear to" make decisions "as
if" they were following strategies derived from
precise optimal calculations:
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It is only a short step from these examples
to the economic hypothesis that under a wide
range of circumstances individual firms behave
as if they were seeking rationally to maximize
their expected returns, and had full knowledge
of the data needed to succeed in this attempt;
as if, that is, they knew the relevant cost and
demand functions, calculated marginal cost and
marginal revenue from all actions open to them,
and pushed each line of action to the point at
which the relevant marginal cost and marginal
revenue were equal. (p.21).
Even though the assumption that an economic
agent employs mathematical optimization in
making every decision is clearly unrealistic,
mainstream economists do accept that agents
behave "as if " they are using optimization.
Friedman' s view of rationality became very
popular among economists, who took the "as if"
rational model as a useful approximation of human
behavior.
The modern notion of rationality in Decision
Theory (or Rational Choice Theory) is based on
Savage' s formalization of Expected Utility Theory
(1954), which states that the decision maker
chooses between risky or uncertain prospects by
comparing their expected utility values. Expected
utility was formalized in the multiplicative
combination of outcome utility values and their
respective probabilities. To be rational in decisionmaking under risk one must have complete and
transitive preferences. In the domain of decisionmaking under uncer taint y, von Neuman nMorgenstern Theory (VNMT) states that being
rational means having preferences that are also
independent. These assumptions of consistency
in preferences allow expected utilities from all
alternatives to be calculated and compared, and
allow a choice to be made for the most preferred

option using utility maximization. In order to
have consistent preferences, a decision maker
is assumed to have all information about all the
options, their probability of occurrence (either
from a probability distribution in the case of
decision under risk, or subjective probability in the
case of decision under uncertainty), and to have
the time and ability to weigh every choice against
every other choice.
In general, the approaches reviewed above
share a concept of rationality developed within
economics bound by the idealistic, logical,
deductive, and normative qualities of homo
economicus. This notion of rationality is "useful
in generating solutions to theoretical problems,
but it demands much of human behavior—much
more in fact than it can deliver" (Arthur, 1994,
p.406). Criticisms about the general assumptions
that this "economic man" represents in economics
have come mainly from three areas. The following
sections review these criticisms.

3. Criticisms of Unbounded Rationality
Around the same time Expected Utility
Theory (EUT) became the dominant model of
individual behavior in economics literature, and
a large body of evidence was accumulating that
human behavior deviates systematically from the
idealized behavior assumed by economists who
believe decision makers maximize expected utility.
3.1 Heuristics and Biases
This evidence (Gilovich, Griffin, &Kahneman,
2002; Kahneman, Slovic, &Tversky, 1982),
collectively dubbed Kahneman and Tversky' s
Heuristics and Biases program, used a broad
array of problems to demonstrate experimentally
that, under quite ordinar y circumstances,
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people reason and make decisions in ways that
systematically deviate from what would be
predicted according to the basic rules of logic and
probability theory. Specifically, people do not
have consistent preferences, and their preferences
may vary in accordance with contextual settings
or mental representations. Such phenomena as the
endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, &Thaler,
1991), loss aversion (ibid.), status quo bias (ibid.),
framing effects (Tversky&Kahneman, 1986), and
preference reversals (Slovic& Lichtenstein, 1983)
are well-established anomalies that violate the
assumption of consistency in Expected Utility
Theory. On the basis of a series of studies, Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) concluded that, "people rely
on a limited number of heuristic principles which
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities
and predicting values to simpler judgemental
operations. In general, these heuristics are
quite useful, but sometimes lead to severe and
systematic errors" (p.1124).
The Heuristics and Biases program showed
that as people employ a handful of heuristics when
making decisions, deviations from normative
models are systematic and predictable. Kahneman
and Tversky (1973) argued that human choices are
not consistent and transitive, as they would be if
a utility function existed. Their studies invalidate
the justification of the "as if" approximation
in normative economic models, and call for
alternative models to be proposed.
Prospect Theory (Kahneman&Tversky, 1979)
offered an alternative framework for judgment and
choice under risk. According to Prospect Theory,
the decision process consists of the editing phase
and the evaluation phase. In the editing phase,
prospects are coded in terms of gains and losses,
combining common features and segregating
riskless components. The core of Prospect
Theory, however, lies in the evaluation phase. A
150

reference-dependent value function together with a
probability weighting function is used to transform
outcomes and probabilities into subjective utility
and decision weights. The value function is
concave for gains and convex for losses. The
weighting function assumes the overweighting of
small probabilities and underweighting of large
probabilities typical of subjective judgments. The
outcomes of these two functions are multiplied in
a similar fashion to calculations used in EUT, and
preferences are predicted by comparing the values
of these outputs. Prospect Theory provided an
account of a range of empirical observations on the
differential weighting of gains and losses, as well
as high and low probabilities; thus, its formulation
solved several violations of Subjective Expected
Utility Theory (SEU). This theory provides a good
descriptive account of decision making under risk,
but remains only a descriptive account, because
it does not answer why people employ such
heuristics.
Similar to work by Evans and Over (1996)
that marked a distinction between bounded and
unbounded rationality types, Kahneman (2003)
emphasized a distinction between two types
of mental processes: those that are part of the
intuitive automatic system (which are error-prone),
and those that are part of the serial effortful
deductive system that follows strict rules.
By treating decision heuristics as biases, the
evident conclusion is that humans are not rational
because they systematically display reasoning
errors and inconsistency in preferences relative
to normative standards. As with optical illusions,
human are easily susceptible to cognitive illusions
that cannot be reconciled (Kahneman, 1996).
The Heuristics and Biases program preserved the
normative standards of Neo-classical Economics
while developing the view that the human mind
normally operates using heuristics. This extreme
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conclusion from the heuristics and biases programthat deviations from SEU theory are biased and
irrational-has met with severe criticism from
several researchers. Rather than detailing these
numerous criticisms, I will focus instead on
the alternative approach offered by bounded
rationality.
3.2 Bounded Rationality
In an attempt to understand complex human
decision making, Herbert Simon (1955, 1979, 1982,
1992, 1997a) was the first to chart both how and
why cognitive reality departs from the formalized
ideal decision environment assumed by normative
theories of Economics. As Simon (1975) noted:
The capacit y of the hu man m ind for
formulation and solving complex problems
is very small compared with the size of the
problem s whose solut ion is requ i red for
objectively rational behavior in the real worldor even for a reasonable approximation of such
objective rationality (p.198).
This f undamental limitation on human
information processing gives rise, according
to Simon, to satisficing behavior-the tendency
to settle for satisfactory, rather than optimal,
courses of action. In terms of bounded rationality,
people satisfice with respect to their aspiration
level instead of optimizing with respect to all
information about the world.
"One requirement of optimization not shared
by satisficing is that all alternatives must be
measurable in terms of a common utility function"
(Simon, 1986, p.210). Simon (1956; 1979) pointed
out that blocks of an organism' s time can be
allocated to activities related to individual needs
(separate means-ends chains) without creating any
problem of overall allocation or coordination, or

the need for any general utility function.
Simon (1983) described Subjective Expected
Utility Theory as "a beautiful object deserving
a prominent place in Plato' s heaven of ideas"
(p.13), but pointed out several ways in which realworld decision making falls a long way short of
this ideal. Whereas SEU assumes that decision
makers have an undisturbed view of all possible
scenarios of action, real human decision-making is
almost invariably focused upon specific matters.
The former theory requires that the decision
maker comprehend the entire range of possible
alternatives, but decision makers are most likely to
contemplate only a few of the available alternatives
(Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978). Human
decision-making is constrained by its "keyhole"
view of the problem space-what Simon (1975) has
coined "bounded rationality".
The bounds of rationality are dictated by
the complexity of the world in which we live:
the incompleteness and inadequacy of human
knowledge, the inconsistencies of individual
preference and belief, the conflicts of value among
people and groups of people, and the inadequacy
of the computations we can carry out, even with
the aid of the most powerful computers (see
Simon, 1956).
In contrast with the assumptions of an
economic man, Herbert Simon proposed a model
of a thinking man, who makes decisions by
"satisficing" rather than "maximizing". Simon
(1979) emphasized the following qualities of a
thinking man:
Thinking Man is capable of expressing his
cognitive skills in a wide range of task domains:
learning and remembering, problem solving,
inducing rules and attaining concepts, perceiving
a nd recog n i z i ng st i mu l i, u nder st a nd i ng
natural language, and others. An information151
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processing model of Thinking Man must contain
components capable of humanly intelligent
behavior in each of these domains; and, as these
models are created, they must gradually be
merged into a coherent whole. (p.10).
This account of bounded rationality that
Thinking Man is equipped with is more closely
related to psychological theories of perception,
memory, learning and cognition. It calls for
theories that address not only the cognitive
mechanism of the decision maker who has limited
time and knowledge, but also the structure of
the environment to which the decision maker
adapts. In Simon' s (1956) terms, "Human rational
behavior is shaped by a scissors whose two blades
are the structure of task environments and the
computational capabilities of the actor." (p.129).
Thus, one emphasis of the bounded rationality
approach is the role of the decision environment.
Recent accounts of adaptive rationality focus
particularly on this aspect of rationality and
evaluate rational behavior in light of the structure
of the environ ment, ecological as well as
contextual.
3.3 Adaptive Rationality
The concept of adaptive rationality, or
ecological rationality, is related to the notion of
bounded rationality. Particularly, great emphasis
is placed upon the evaluation of human behavior
in terms of its success in its natural environment
rather than against normative standards. The
central ideal behind adaptive rationality is that
people use heuristics to solve everyday problems;
and human memory and reasoning, which are
evolved to facilitate the use of these heuristics, are
adaptive and successful within a representative
natural environment, even though sometimes these
heuristics produce behaviors that are discordant
152

with the laws of logic, probability theory, expected
utility theory, and rational choice maxims. As
Cosmides and Tooby (1994) pointed out, "Forms
follow function: the properties of an evolved
mechanism ref lect the structure of the task it
evolved to solve." (p.328). These heuristics are
"smart" because they exploit the structure of the
environment, they dispense with optimization and,
for the most part, with calculations of probabilities
and utilities. The fact that such heuristics do not
fit into the framework of decision theory, leads
to the question of whether traditional normative
standards should be used to evaluate human
rationality.
In particular, Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues
(e.g. Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart, 1999b;
Adaptive Thinking, 2000; Bounded Rationality,
2000) established research programs investigating
the adaptive nature of human behavior, with a
focus on the use of fast and frugal heuristics.
Gigerenzer (2000) compared the human brain
to an "adaptive toolbox", which is a repertoire of
such heuristics. Their central argument is that
"fast and frugal" strategies can perform as well as
full optimization if not more, but they operate at a
much lower cost cognitively.
Fast and frugal heuristics such as the recognition heuristic and the "take-the-best" strategy
are extremely effective in tasks like these, when
the distribution of information in the environment
is skewed, and the cognitive resources of the
decision makers are limited. Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (1996) argued that the mere success of
human inferential ability in evolutionary terms
is "an existence proof" for adaptive rationality,
and such rationality need not be judged in terms
of rational norms. They further challenged the
validity of classical rationality as the standard
for measuring rationality, and suggested that
rationality should instead be measured by its
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success in solving ecologically relevant problems.
Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa, and Redington
(2003) examined the viability of fast and frugal
heuristics, and argued that the adaptive rationality
approach could be consistent with classical
rationality assumptions (such as probability theory
and decision theory). They further assessed why
fast and frugal heuristics are rational heuristics
using the rational analysis method (Anderson,
1990). Evaluating the take-the-best heuristic
(TTB) against the normative criteria, Chater et al.
found that TTB performs impressively-especially
in a frugal information environment-compared
with other standard algorithms such as exemplarbased models (e.g., Nosofsky, 1990), connectionist
networks (Rumelhart& McClelland, 1986),
and decision trees (Quinlan, 1993). TTB is also
impressive because it represents a process that
is comparable to human performance. However,
detailed analysis revealed that, though the TTB
heuristic is fast and frugal, in some cases other
algorithms are just as cognitively plausible.
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) showed
that fast and frugal heuristics are among a
continuum of strategies that people employ
daily. These heuristics are seen as applicable to
a wide range of reasoning and judgement tasks
(see Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999;
Dhame& Ayton, 2001 for some interesting
examples). Fast and f r ugal heu r istics like
TTB thrive in a decision environment where
information is scarce and time is pressing. But
given enough time and resources, people may
not necessarily choose fast and frugal heuristics.
Oppenheimer (2003) questioned the reason why
the recognition heuristic, which is fundamental
in the adaptive toolbox, succeeded. He suggested
that its success may be attributed to people using
knowledge associated with the non-compensatory
cue of recognition rather than pure recognition. In

the city size example, Oppenheimer hypothesizes
that the recognition heuristic works because of
people' s knowledge that the known cities are
large. To test his hypothesis, he used local cities
that are recognized but known to be small, and
fictional cities for which participants could have
no recognition. He found that local cities that
people recognized were chosen as the smaller city
on average, contrary to Gigerenzer and Goldstein' s
finding, if taken at face value. Oppenheimer' s
finding highlights the importance of the ecological
validity of cues, and that the structure of the
environment where information is retrieved may
determine both the choice of heuristics and their
success rate.
Our memory system is one aspect of adaptive
cognition that is optimized to the structure of the
environment (Anderson &Schooler, 1991). The
rate of forgetting an item in memory is optimized
to the likelihood of encountering that item in
the world. A rational analysis of information
encoding in memory reveals that forgetting is
adaptive, because it reflects the pattern with which
certain information appears and reappears in the
environment (Schooler&Hertwig, 2005).
Oaksford and Chater (1998) reviewed the
adaptableness of human behavior in light of
the structure of the task environment. Aspects
of adaptive cognition including categorization,
information searching, and selecting evidence in
reasoning may all be viewed as optimizing the
amount of information gained at a fixed cost. The
rational analysis approach to cognition can be seen
as both descriptive and normative, because its
hypotheses can be tested against empirical data. It
can explain both how the mind works and why it is
successful. This direction of research is different
to that of deductive Neo-classical rationality in
the a priori assumptions it holds. Rational analysis
holds the assumption that accounts of the mind
153
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must not only be both normatively justified, but
also descriptively adequate.

4. Conclusion
The important differences in conceptualizations of rationality rest on a fundamental
distinction: in economics, rationality is viewed in
terms of the choices it produces; in the other social
sciences, it is viewed in terms of the processes it
employs (Simon, 1976, 1982, 1997).
To be rational from the point of view of
economics, with its manifestation of modern
decision theory and probability theory, is to be
deductive, logical, and consistent. When evaluating human behavior against these standards,
systematic deviations from normative answers
are often observed (as revealed by the heuristic
and biases program). The heuristics and biases
program treated these deviations as human
biases, and suggested modifications to existing

rational models (such as Expected Utility Theory)
to incorporate these biases. In contrast to this,
Gigerenzer (1996) argued that the norms for
evaluating reasoning and decisions have been
too narrowly drawn, and the type of reasoning
task used to evaluate human rationality is devoid
of context and content (Hertwig, Ortmann,
&Gigerenzer, 1997). It is not irrational to make
such errors, as people are adaptive thinkers
who draw inferences from the statistical world
where inductive information is valuable (e.g.
Gigerenzer& Goldstein, 1996; Oaksford&Chater,
1994). Recent work has shifted the focus to notions
of bounded and adaptive rationality, which aim to
explain why it is that people use heuristics. Crucial
to the shift is the emphasis on the structure of the
environment. In a world of uncertainties, rational
judgement will largely depend on making correct
inference about the information distribution of the
environment.
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